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DESIGNING COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL
BUFFERS
BY BRETT H. MCDONNELL*

I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2008 has brought banking, financial
markets, and financial regulation back to center stage. For decades,
Americans could assume that recessions, even depressions, caused by
financial panics were a thing of the past. No longer. Now we must reexamine how to regulate banks and related financial institutions and
markets.
One design issue in this re-examination is how regulation
responds to cycles in financial markets. Observers have long noted that
ideally we would like financial regulation to be countercyclical. That is,
regulation should grow stronger as financial markets head into periods
of speculative booms, bubbles, and excessive debt, while regulation
should be loosened during and after crises in order to give financial
institutions room to extend more credit in support of a recovery. Alas,
buffeted by the same factors which cause cycles in financial markets,
financial regulation instead tends to be procyclical, loosening during
booms and getting tougher after crises.
How might we combat this tendency, and make financial
regulation countercyclical rather than procyclical? One option is to try
to build countercyclicality explicitly into the rules, tying the strength of
regulation to determinations of where financial markets currently stand
within a cycle. Doing that is easier said than done, but several of the
leading regulatory responses to the 2008 financial crisis have tried. In
particular, both the Dodd-Frank Act' and the new Basel III international
agreement 2 face up to the issue in designing capital requirements for
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota School of Law.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
*

2. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL Ill: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010), available at

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_ dec20 10.pdf.
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banks and related financial institutions. Basel III and proposed U.S.
regulations implementing Basel I 3 and the Dodd-Frank requirement
create a new "countercyclical capital buffer" which in times of
perceived booms in credit markets imposes a higher level of capital
reserves on regulated entities. When a crisis hits, this capital buffer is
supposed to be eliminated.
This essay briefly explores why financial regulation tends to be
procyclical, how the new capital buffer attempts to address that
tendency, and how well the attempt is likely to work. The verdict is
mixed. The new countercyclical buffer may do some good. However,
some features in its design may lead to it not being triggered when it
should, and to weakening its effect even when it is triggered. I suggest
some design tweaks which may help.
The essay is organized as follows. Part II analyzes the
psychological and political factors which create the core problem of
procyclicality. 4 Part III describes the new countercyclical capital buffer
rules.5 Part IV examines how the new buffer is triggered, and suggests
a better process. 6 Part V explores a few other issues in the design of the
new buffer.7 Part VI concludes.
II. COMBATING PROCYCLICAL REGULATION

Banks and other financial institutions and markets that resemble
banks are subject to cycles. In boom times, they engage in speculative
lending that builds up excessive levels of leverage. Eventually the
bubble bursts, and the system heads into a crisis. Banks with too much
debt begin to fail, and their failure leads to a contagious panic. In
response even relatively healthy entities cut back on their lending. The
crisis in the financial sector leads to recession in the real economy,
which in turn worsens the financial crisis. As the world is currently

3. See generally Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of
Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions,
and Prompt Corrective Action, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,792 (Aug. 30, 2012) [hereinafter
Implementation of Basel Ill].
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part VI.
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experiencing, it takes a long time to recover from such a crisis.9
We would like financial regulation to lean against this wind and
try to limit the severity of such cycles. That is, regulation should
become tougher as booms start to turn speculative in order to limit the
degree of unwise speculation and lending that occurs, and become more
forgiving in the wake of a crisis so as to not block needed investment
during hard times. o Alas, that is not what we observe. Typically,
regulation actually tends to loosen during the booms, then strengthen
with reforms following a crisis. Regulation in practice is procyclical,
whereas in theory it should be countercyclical."
The same
psychological biases (particularly the availability bias) which affect
actors in the financial markets also affect regulators, both directly and
via political pressure on them.' 2
Many have noted this tendency to procyclical regulation.
However, they have differed markedly in their positive and normative
analyses of the nature of the problem at different stages of the cycle. I
have analyzed these differences elsewhere, and grouped analysts within
three competing types of models.13 Those in model 2 are skeptical of
much financial regulation, and see the main threat in the tendency to
over-regulation following crises. 14 Those in model 3 think financial
regulation tends to be too weak, and see the main threat in the tendency
to de-regulation during boom periods.' 5 Those in model 1 see both
9. For the leading economic theory of such financial crises, see HYMAN P. MINSKY,
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE, ECONOMY ( 2nd ed., McGraw-Hill 2008) (1986). For historical
analyses, see CARMEN M. REINHARDT & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT:
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z.
ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005).

10. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Dampening FinancialRegulatory Cycles, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1597 (2013); Samuel Hanson et al., A MacroprudentialApproach to Financial
Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2011).
11. McDonnell, supra note 10; see also ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2013); JILL M. HENDRICKSON.,

REGULATION AND

INSTABILITY IN U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKING: A HISTORY OF CRISES 14 (2011); David

Hirshleifer, Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT.
856 (2008); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549 (2002).

12.

McDonnell, supra note 10, at 8-12.

13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 12-14. See also, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REV. 77

(2003); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
442, 2012), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract- 1974148.
15. Id. at 14-16. See also, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of DoddFrank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated
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over-regulation following crises and under-regulation during booms,
although some semi-optimistically note that at least these countervailing
effects tend to lead to a relatively proper level of regulation in the long
run.16 The group a person identifies with naturally affects their
prescriptions for regulation. In what follows, I shall put myself in
model 1, and hence be concerned with mistakes in both phases of the
cycle, for reasons I have developed elsewhere.1 7 However, I shall also
consider how advocates of models 2 and 3 might react differently to the
issues discussed below.
One obvious way to react to this problem is to try to build
countercyclical rules directly into legislation and regulation.' 8 Possibly
the leading attempts to do so in financial regulation are the Dodd-Frank
and Basel III countercyclical capital buffers which are at issue in this
paper. How should such countercyclical rules work, and what are the
chances for success given the cognitive and political pressures for
procyclical regulation? We would like the rules to be as automatic as
possible, subject to as little discretion from regulators as possible, given
the cognitive and political pressures on the regulators. Insofar as we
deem it necessary for regulators to retain some degree of discretion, we
want those regulators to be insulated from political pressure (which
tends to be procyclical), and we want to do what we can to limit the
influence of the various cognitive biases on them.
Why might we want to retain any discretion, given the hazards?
The difficulty is coming up with automatic rules that are triggered to
strengthen and weaken at the right time. Automatic rules will need to
use a measure or measures of economic conditions which specify when
to tighten or loosen the rule. No measure will do a perfect job for this
task, and with no discretion at all, they run the risk of sometimes setting
the rule very badly indeed. Thus, there are some hard design choices to
be made in balancing rules and discretion.' 9
(Columbia
Law and Econ. Working Paper, No. 414, 2012), available
athttp://ssrn.com/abstsract-1982128.
16. McDonnell, supra note 10, at 9-12. Another significant statement of this position
is GERDING, supra note 11.
17. McDonnell, supra note 10, at 9-12.
18. Id. at 32.
19. See Michael Kowalik, Countercyclical Capital Regulation: Should Bank
Regulators Use Rules or Discretion?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CiTy ECON. REV., 2d
Quarter
2011,
at
63,
63-64,
available
at
http://
www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/ I q2Kowalik.pdf
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In thinking through these design choices, we should consider
different types of errors that can be made, and their relative likelihood
and severity given general features of the market and regulatory cycles.
We want to consider how proposed countercyclical rules will function
both in boom periods and following crises. In each period, two kinds of
errors are possible. Drawing upon the terminology of statistics, we can
label a type I error when the rule fails to change strength (increase in a
boom, decrease in a crisis) when it should. In a type II error, the rule
changes strength when it shouldn't. We thus have four cases to worry
about:
* Failing to strengthen during a boom (boom type
I). Here, the countercyclical rule is failing in its
basic purpose. It is not actively causing harm
(relative to not attempting a countercyclical
design at all), but it is doing no good. Where the
rule design allows a good deal of discretion, the
likelihood of this error is quite high, due to the
cognitive and political biases which create
procyclicality, although one can attempt to put
in place features that shield regulators from
these biases. For a highly automatic rule, the
likelihood of this type of error depends upon the
accuracy of the rule (this point applies for all
types of errors with highly automatic rules; take
it as given below). Research from economists at
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 20
suggests a measure which is fairly accurate at
identifying speculative booms.
* Strengthening during a perceived, but not actual,
speculative boom (boom type II). Here the
countercyclical rule slows down lending and
economic growth unnecessarily. Although it
would have to get things quite wrong indeed to
lead to a recession, it could lead to slower
growth than would occur otherwise. Thus, for
20. See generally Mathias Drehmann et al., Countercyclical CapitalBuffers: Exploring
at
2010),
available
No.
317,
Papers
(BIS
Working
Options
http://www.bis.org/publ/work317.pdf.
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moderate versions of this error, the damage is
not all that great. This error is quite unlikely for
discretionary rules (since regulators are inclined
in the opposite direction), and as just noted for
automatic rules, it appears a measure (BIS
Measure) is available which would make the
error unlikely.
Failing to weaken during a crisis (crisis type I).
This type of error has the potential to cause great
harm, as it may stop the economy from
recovering after a crisis. However, there are
reasons to be not heavily concerned about this
type of error. For discretionary rules, once a
crisis has become severe, regulators will
recognize it-a financial crisis in full fury is
hard to miss (there is an asymmetry here from
speculative booms). And in the middle of a
crisis, there will be pressure from bankers to
weaken the rules. If a rule is supposed to be
weakened in a crisis, it will be hard for
regulators to avoid doing so. It is true that often
during crises, regulators will strengthen existing
rules and create new ones to address perceived
problems that led to the crisis. They may
increase the baseline strength of the rule in
question (capital requirements in our case-as
indeed has happened with Basel III). However,
they would seem to be unlikely to maintain the
countercyclical component of the rule at high
strength, given the obviousness of crisis
conditions. What is more likely, though, is that
under discretionary rules, regulators may miss
the early signs of a crisis, and thus not weaken
the rule as early as one would hope. For
automatic rules the BIS researchers have not
found quite so accurate a measure for crises, so
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there is some real risk for this type of error. 2 1
But here too, once the crisis truly hits in full
force, plausible measures should identify that.
Thus, for both discretionary and automatic rules
in times of crisis, the rules may be somewhat
slow to identify the crisis in its early stages, but
they are quite likely to identify the crisis once it
becomes severe. This fact greatly reduces our
concern for crisis type I error, because of the
nature of lending during and after crises. As a
crisis builds, lending is likely to fall (eventually,
to plummet), pretty much no matter what the
regulatory climate is. During the early phase,
regulatory loosening following a countercyclical
Where the
rule is thus unlikely to help.
loosening matters more is in the time following
the trough of the crisis, when recovery begins.
Here, overly tight rules can do serious harm, but
as we have just seen, the likelihood of this type
of error lasting to this point is quite small.
Weakening during a perceived, but not actual,
crisis (crisis type II). When this sort of error
happens, the countercyclical rule which has been
strengthened to combat a speculative boom is
weakened prematurely, while the boom
continues. As with a boom type I error, the
countercyclical structure thus fails to do what it
is supposed to, allowing speculation to increase
and making the future crisis worse than it would
With
be in the absence of this error.
discretionary rules, there is a decent likelihood
of this occurring, given the cognitive and
political biases during booms. Due to the more
questionable quality of available economic
measures identifying the onset of crisis, this
error may also be decently likely with automatic

21.

Id.

129
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rules.
Given the imperfection of both regulators and economic
measures of booms and busts, no countercyclical rule policy can reduce
the possibility of all four types of errors to zero. Different rules will
produce a different mix of probabilities for the four types. We are thus
looking for a mix of rule and discretion which achieves the best tradeoff
available among them. In Part III we will look at the rules that have
been proposed by U.S. and international regulators, and then in Parts IV
and V we will evaluate those rules within the framework discussed here.
III. BASEL III AND PROPOSED IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

In this section I will first very briefly outline the basic structure
of capital requirements under U.S. banking regulation and Basel, and
then describe the proposed countercyclical capital buffers.
In the 1980s, U.S. banking regulators introduced risk-weighted
capital requirements. To avoid imposing a competitive disadvantage on
U.S. banks, U.S. regulators worked with the leading banking regulators
of other countries to produce the Basel I rules, 22 which impose riskweighted capital requirements on banks in most of the world. Capital
requirements are a way of reducing leverage and of trying to assure that
banks have resources available to cope with hard times. The riskweighted requirements of Basel I look to a fraction. In the numerator of
that fraction is a measure of the capital of a bank. Capital comes in
various forms, more or less sure and readily available to the bank in bad
times. Basel I divides capital into Tier I (the safest kind) and Tier II,
and includes several relevant measures based on each.
In the
denominator is a measure of a bank's assets. These assets are weighted
by their perceived riskiness, with each type of asset being assigned to
one of a few categories and weighted by the risk level assigned to that
category. Once the measures of capital and assets are calculated, the
divisions are done to produce the capital measures.
In the U.S., these measures are then used within the supervision
and prompt corrective action system. There are various levels of
capitalization based on the measures (well-capitalized, adequately
22. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT
AND
CAPITAL
STANDARDS
(1988),
available

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc11 .pdf.

OF
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capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, and
critically undercapitalized), and the activities of a bank are more
restricted the more undercapitalized it is. 23 Basel II modified the way
asset risk was calculated, in ways not relevant to our discussion here. 24
Basel III made further modifications to the calculation of both
assets and capital, again not relevant to our discussion here. 25 it
increased the required capital requirements. For the measure using all
allowable forms of capital, a bank must have capital equal to at least 8%
of risk-weighted assets in order to be well capitalized. In addition,
Basel III adds a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer.
The capital conservation buffer of 2.5% sits on top of the basic capital
requirement. Thus, for the total capital measure, the combined level is
10.5%. A bank between 8% and 10.5% will not face any of the
restrictions of the prompt corrective action rules, but it will face a few
restrictions. In particular, several forms of distributions from earnings
will be limited or prohibited. Affected distributions include dividends,
share buybacks, discretionary payments of some forms of capital, and
discretionary bonus payments to staff.
The countercyclical buffer-our main concern here-augments
this capital conservation buffer. When the relevant regulatory agency,
or agencies, declares that this countercyclical buffer has been triggered,
the capital conservation buffer will increase. The most the buffer will
increase is an additional 2.5%. Thus, when the countercyclical buffer is
at its maximum, the cutoff level of total capital below which the
distribution limits will apply is 13%.26 In the U.S., the relevant
regulatory agencies are proposing to apply the countercyclical buffer
only to "advanced approaches banking organizations." These are the
large and sophisticated banks which are allowed to use their internal
risk measures in calculating risk-weighted assets. 27
Who will determine what the countercyclical buffer is, and on
what basis will they make that determination? Basel III leaves it to each

23.

See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b)(6), 1831o.

24. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004),

availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsI07.pdf.
25. Basel Ill, supra note 2.
26. Basel ill, supra note 2, at 54-58.
27. Implementation of Basel III, supra note 3, at 33.
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country to choose an authority to make decisions on the buffer. 28 In the
U.S., under the proposed regulations implementing Basel III, the
decision will be made jointly by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve (Fed), and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 29 An increase in the buffer will take
effect twelve months after it is announced, in order to give banks time
to build up their capital, while a decrease will take effect immediately.
The international guidelines for setting the buffer begin with one
statistical measure as a reference guide, the aggregate private sector
credit-to-GDP gap. 30 The Basel committee gives fairly precise
guidance on calculating this number. One takes a broad measure of the
total credit in the private sector (with the statistical measure to use
specified in some detail), divides this by GDP, calculates the long term
time trend of this figure using a specified statistical procedure, then
calculates the percentage deviation from trend of the current figure. The
guidance then specifies levels of this number at which one should
expect the buffer to increase. 3 1 However, this figure is just a starting
point. The national authority is expected to start with the number, but
then exercise judgment, guided by several broad principles. 32 This thus
represents a blend of rule and discretion, discussed in more detail in the
next part.
The U.S. regulatory agencies do not quite propose to follow this
guidance. They state that they expect to consider a range of
macroeconomic, financial, and supervisory information indicating an
increase in systemic risk. This information includes,, but is not limited
to, the ratio of credit to gross domestic product, a variety of asset prices,
other factors indicative of relative credit and liquidity expansion or
contraction, funding spreads, credit condition surveys, indices based on
credit default swap spreads, options implied volatility, and measures of
systemic risk.33

Thus, the U.S. agencies do not focus on one statistic to the
28.
29.

Basel Ill, supra note 2, at 58.
Implementation of Basel III, supra note 3, at 34.

30. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDANCE FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
OPERATING THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER 2-3(Dec. 2010), available at

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl87.pdf [hereinafter Guidance].
31. Id., at Annex 1.
32.

Id. at 2-5.

33.

Implementation of Basel III, supra note 3, at 34.
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extent suggested in the Basel guidelines. Although the Basel statistic is
the first specific statistic listed by the U.S. agencies, it is the first in a
rather long list. As will be discussed in the next part, such a laundry list
in effect grants the agencies a very wide degree of discretion.
IV. ISSUES WITH THE TRIGGER

Our discussion in Part II suggested that we should look for a
rather rule-like, automatic trigger for setting the buffer level, one which
leaves regulators little discretion, because of the various biases which
are likely to afflict regulators. Given the imperfection of usable
statistical measures, we want to maintain some discretion, but it should
be limited.3 4
The Basel mechanism does not fully fit that description, and the
proposed U.S. implementation is yet more wide of the mark. Basel does
start with one reference statistic, the credit-to-GDP gap, as one would
want in a rule-based approach. However, it then stresses that regulators
must use broad judgment rather than rely on this measure, although it
does lay out a few principles to guide that judgment. 35 The resulting
degree of judgment and discretion seems rather more than is desirable,
at least insofar as one believes that the core statistic is quite reliable. 36
The U.S. proposed implementation strays further from a rule-like
procedure because it does not single out one statistic as a starting point.
Rather, it sets out a range of statistics to which regulators will look,
without saying anything about relative priority or about the range of
values for specific statistics which may indicate a desirable change in
the buffer level. Such a smorgasbord of available data essentially gives

34. There is a separate reason why the Basel rule should probably not be more rule-like
than it is. Basel sets an international standard, which must then be implemented by national
regulators. There are good reasons why one might want the international standard to give
national regulators plenty of room to design their own rules, even if one thinks that those
national regulations should themselves be quite rule-like. Thus, it is possible that in this
case, even though Basel is more rule-like than the American regulation, still the Basel
regulation is more rule-like than it should be as an international standard, while the
American regulation is less rule-like than it should be as an implementation of that
international standard. For a discussion suggesting that in general Basel should move
towards a less rule-like approach, see Claire A. Hill and Brett H. McDonnell, International
FinancialRegulation: First, Do No Harm, in FESTSCHRIFT KIRCHNER (Wulf Kaal et al. eds.

forthcoming 2014).
35.

See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 24.

36.

See Guidance, supra note 30, at Annex 1; Drehmann et al., supra note 20.
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regulators largely unfettered discretion, which we have seen is
undesirable.
What might a more rule-bound countercyclical rule look like?
Basel III gets fairly close. Imagine the following modification. Start
with the statistic featured in Basel III, and specify various levels of that
statistic which should trigger increases in the buffer, as Basel III does.
Now, instead of then leaving it all to regulatory judgment, state that it is
an explicit presumption that the buffer level should change when the
indicated statistic levels are reached. However, the presumption should
be rebuttable by the relevant regulators. It should not be easily
rebuttable, though. The rule should state that if regulators choose to
deviate from the presumed level, they must justify their decision
publicly. The rule should give guidance as to what such justification
should entail, with the Basel III guidance already giving a pretty good
outline for such guidance. Depending upon the decision making
structure of the relevant regulator, one also might want to impose
procedural limits on decisions to deviate, for instance a supermajority
voting rule.
In the U.S., three regulators will jointly set the countercyclical
buffer. Two of these (the Fed and the FDIC) are independent agencies,
as one wants in order to limit political pressure and resulting procyclical
bias. The other, the OCC, is an agency of the Treasury, and hence more
politically accountable. 37 It is not at all clear if one should really want
the Treasury involved. However, assuming its involvement is inevitable
(which politically seems likely), we can make good use of the
involvement of three regulators to impose a procedural rule limiting
discretion to vary from the presumptive level: require agreement from
all three agencies to justify a variation from the presumptive level.
37. The OCC is in some ways more independent than many agencies. For instance, its
budget is largely set through an assessment on banks rather than being dependent upon
Congressional appropriations, see 12 U.S.C. § 16, and the Secretary of the Treasury may not
delay or prevent the issuance of rules which the OCC promulgates, see 12 U.S.C. § 1(b)(1).
However, the President may remove the Comptroller for cause. See 12 U.S.C. § 2.
Moreover, the OCC is headed by one person (the Comptroller) rather than by a multi-person
Commission which must include representatives of both parties. A limit on removal without
cause and the use of a multi-person bipartisan commission are both conventionally seen as
critical elements of agency independence, see Kirti Datla and Richard L. Revesz,
DeconstructingIndependent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
776 n. 24 (describing while contesting the "consensus view" that a for-cause removal clause
constitutes the central dividing line defining independent agencies), and the Federal Reserve
and FDIC both possess these features of independence.
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How would such an approach fare with our four types of errors?
For boom type I error, the credit gap statistic works well historically,
and makes good intuitive and theoretical sense. So starting with that
statistic ought to lead to increases in the buffer in most instances when
an increase is appropriate. Given both regulatory biases and the limits
on regulator discretion of the proposal, regulators are unlikely to adjust
upward where the statistic fails to properly indicate a change.
Therefore, boom type I errors would still occur, but they should be
infrequent so long as the statistic works well. The limits on regulator
discretion should make it hard for regulators to block an increase when
the statistic rightly calls for one; however, it could still occur. The main
point of the limits on discretion is to prevent regulators from blocking
an increase when the statistic calls for it, the main threat for creating
this type of error. As long as there is any discretion, this type of error
can still occur-determined regulators may choose to override the
presumed increase. But unless one really trusts the available statistics
quite a bit, or sees the harm from this type of error as quite limited, one
presumably wants to leave some degree of discretion, albeit tightly
constrained. In contrast, the high degree of regulator discretion under
the approach suggested by the U.S. agencies would create a high
likelihood of this type of error, threatening to undermine much of the
point of the countercyclical buffer.
For boom type II error (inappropriate strengthening), again the
relative accuracy of the statistic gives a good starting point. Moreover,
for this type of error the backdrop of some regulator discretion gives
some chance of correcting such an error (this, after all, is the main point
of retaining some discretion). If the main statistic incorrectly indicates
a buffer increase where it is inappropriate, regulators are likely to want
to block the increase, and in such instances they should be able to point
to many other measures set out in the rule which suggest an increase is
inappropriate (it would be unlikely for all of the statistics to uniformly
point to an increased buffer where such an increase is truly
inappropriate and harmful). It must be admitted, though, that this type
of error is more likely under my proposed approach than under that
proposed by the U.S. agencies, where it is very unlikely indeed.
For crisis type I error (failure to weaken), there is some real
concern that the leading statistic will be slow to identify an emerging
crisis, and even that the regulators will be slow to act to override the

136

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

statistic's presumption. Among other things, the BIS's own economists
are more skeptical about the functioning of the credit-to-GDP gap in
identifying a crisis. 38 Indeed, their work suggests alternative statistical
measures to use in this phase of the cycle, which suggests a different
triggering measure for our presumptive rule when it comes to reducing
the buffer. Still, as noted above, when a financial crisis really hits, it is
unmistakable, and even if the main statistic one uses does not respond,
regulators will know that a crisis has hit and it is time to lower the
buffer. 39 And as noted above, some tardiness in lowering the buffer
during a crisis is unlikely to cause too much extra damage as long as the
buffer is lowered by the time the worst of the crisis has passed, since in
the middle of the crisis banks will be very conservative anyway.
For crisis type II error (weakening when unjustified), the
tendency of the leading statistics to reflect an emerging crisis rather
slowly makes this type of error fairly likely for our rule-bound
suggested approach. The ability of regulators to overcome the
presumption may increase the likelihood of this error somewhat, but
given the limits on their discretion, one hopes this effect will not be too
significant. Even if this error does occur, its effects may not be that
dire. I do not have a terribly clear sense of how crisis type I and II
errors would act in the U.S. proposed highly discretionary approach as
compared with my more rule-based system. Perhaps, type I error would
be a bit less likely and type II a bit more under the regulators' proposal,
but I doubt the differences would be all that great.
No system is perfect. Any suggestion would create some risk of
all four types of errors, with significant likelihood for at least some of
them. Still, the above argument suggests a more rule-based alternative
along the lines suggested here, rather than leaving regulators with as
much discretion as the U.S. proposal. The key difference, swamping
the others, is boom type I error, i.e. failing to increase the
countercyclical buffer when conditions warrant an increase. This type
of error is quite likely to occur under the proposal of U.S. regulators,
calling the whole point of the countercyclical buffer into question. The
more rule-based approach would significantly reduce the probability of
this type of error, with only limited cost in the increased probability of
other types of error.
38.

Drehmann et al., supra note 20.

39.

See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 24.

2013]

COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFERS

137

V. OTHER DESIGN ISSUES

Several other elements in the design of the Basel III
countercyclical buffer and its proposed U.S. implementation deserve
some comment and questioning.
As noted above, the U.S. regulators propose limiting the
countercyclical capital buffer only to "advanced approaches banking
organizations," the largest and most sophisticated of banks. They
justify this by saying that the failure of such banks poses a greater risk
to the financial system, and therefore there is more need of a capital
buffer to prevent them from failing. 40 However, many smaller banks
following similar strategies all failing at the same time can pose as
much risk as one bigger bank with as many total assets. After all, the
grandfather of all bank crises, the Great Depression, flowed from the
mass failure of many small banks, not a few "too big to fail banks." In
general, I think the "too big to fail problem" is somewhat exaggerated
relative to other issues in financial regulation. 4 1 That is not to say that
too big to fail is not a problem at all, and I do believe that a higher
capital requirement for systemically important institutions is quite a
good idea.
But I do not see any particular connection to the
countercyclical buffer problem.
Another matter of some concern is the twelve month delay in
effectiveness for increases to the countercyclical capital buffer. This
exacerbates the cost of boom type I errors, the core error threatening the
effectiveness of this whole endeavor. There is a strong built-in
tendency for the regulatory system to be slow in recognizing the
creation of a speculative boom. More automatic rules will reduce this
tendency, but even statistics are often somewhat slow in revealing major
changes in market dynamics. Waiting an entire year for buffer increases
that will often already be rather late in being announced may seriously
diminish the effectiveness of the whole countercyclical buffer
requirement.
The justification for the twelve month delay is to give banks
time to build up their capital to the newly required level.42 Given the

40. Implementation of Basel III, supra note 3, at 33.
41. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, FinancialRegulation Reform and Too Big to
Fail, I AM. U.Bus. L. REv. 116 (2011-12).
42. Implementation of Basel 111,supra note 3, at 34.
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fairly light consequences that flow from a bank's capital level falling
within the buffer zone-doing so only limits the bank's ability to make
certain distributions from earnings-I am not sure I see the need for this
delay. Even if one believes some delay is necessary, need it be a whole
twelve months? One way of giving effect to the change more quickly
would be to increase the buffer in stages. For instance, after an increase
is announced, one could implement 25% of the increase in three
months, 50% in six months, 75% in nine months, and the full increase
in twelve months.
The final, and perhaps biggest, design issue I'd like to discuss is
the link of the countercyclical capital buffer to the capital conservation
buffer. As noted above, the consequences of falling within the buffer
zone are not severe, with affected banks only having to limit some
distributions from earnings. 43 Does this really do enough to limit
speculative activities during a boom?
I am skeptical.
The
countercyclical measure would have more bite if it increased the levels
of capital required to qualify as well-capitalized, adequately capitalized,
and so on. As noted above, falling below these levels has a wider range
of consequences, imposing ever greater restrictions on banks the lower
the capitalization level in which they are categorized. I will note a
counter-consideration to this point, however. I suspect that regulators
have designed the countercyclical buffer in this way precisely because
they are concerned about pushback if they give the new requirement too
much bite. If so, and if the change I suggest were made, regulators
might be more worried about increasing the countercyclical capital
requirement. Even with limits to their discretion, they might be worried
enough to brush aside those constraints and prevent an increase. If so,
perhaps it is worth having a countercyclical rule with weaker
consequences if that very weakness makes regulators more willing to
make countercyclical adjustments.
VI. CONCLUSION

We have seen why procyclicality is counterproductive and yet is
still a common feature of financial regulation. We have also seen how
Basel III and the proposed regulations implementing Basel III in the
U.S. attempt to insert a degree of countercyclicality into capital
43.

See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 24.
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requirements. The result is still a work in progress. The new rules are
better than nothing, and may do some good. However, they could be
better. The U.S. regulations in particular should rely less on the
discretion of the financial regulatory agencies in deciding when to
trigger the capital buffer. The whole reason that we need the
countercyclical buffer is that a variety of cognitive and political factors
tend to make regulators let down their guard when financial markets get
frothy. A rule trying to combat those factors should not rely upon the
largely unconstrained discretion of those regulators. More rule, less
discretion please.

